Part of the charm of Wall Street, and what scares most reasonable people away, is that it is as close to a meritocracy as exists on this earth. It’s dog eat dog. It’s sink or swim. You do a trade and it makes money, then you’re a hero (for a moment anyway) and deserve a bonus. You bring in a deal, you get paid. You lasso more clients’ assets under your firm’s roof, you’re a hitter. I once discovered some good news on the stocks I followed before the rest of the Street, and mentioned it to the sales force at a morning meeting and moved markets in New York, Tokyo and London. I had the head of global equities pat my head on the elevator ride up the next morning. Pat my head! I was told he never does that.
The flip side, of course, is what makes Wall Street so dangerous. You lose money for the firm and you’re a heel. Do it again and you don’t get paid that year. Do it a third time and you’re out of a job. Just like that. Gone. I’ve seen it happen to friends and acquaintances at just about every firm up and down Wall Street. There is no tenure on Wall Street, no job security, no long-term guarantees. Ten- and 20-year careers end in a flash. Happens all the time, and everybody who works in the business knows this.
That’s one reason why everyone is paid so well. Think of it as combat pay. But the other reason compensation is many, many multiples of the average wage in this country is that trading stocks, doing IPOs, merging companies, managing money is a very lucrative business. Not everyone can do it. It looks easy, football-field-sized trading rooms jammed with adrenalin-rush maniacs sitting in front of huge LCD screens. It might as well be a call center in Mumbai. But it’s hard. Really nasty hard. Wall Street hires in that 99 percentile zone. And then they make your life miserable hoping you’ll quit before they break you. Or hoping they break you before you lose money for the firm. It’s not WalMart or General Motors or even Pfizer or Intel. It’s trial by fire.
You would think that would make the entire workforce afraid to do anything for fear of being tossed…
We’re at a truly fascinating crossroads in modern economic times. Financial theory as we have come to know it will be changed forever based the recent actions of Ben Bernanke and global central bankers. Millions of textbooks will be rewritten in the coming 10 years and careers will either flourish or die on the back of the actions of these bankers. Those in favor of Bernanke’s legendary helicopter drop are celebrating a 6 month rally in equities, but a vital piece of the recovery puzzle remains missing. While Bernanke and Co. fire up the printing presses, and the banks sell the recovery hook line and sinker to the investing public, we continue to see very weak consumer trends.
As we sit on the one year anniversary of the demise of Lehman Brothers it’s most appropriate to ask what we have achieved over the last few months and years in regards to policy action. Many say we avoided the second great depression and praise Bernanke for his innovative and swift actions. Others (myself included) believe we have simply kicked the can down the road and foresee an end to Bernanke’s career that very much mirrors Mr. Greenspan’s. As we noted back in August, Bernanke’s real report card is less than impressive:
• 4 million lost jobs
• 4.6 percentage point surge in the unemployment rate
• 20% decline in the S&P 500
• 30% plunge in house values
• A 3.5% reduction in real GDP per capita
• 11% decline in the trade-weighed dollar
• 109 failed banks (almost matching the total from the prior 13 years combined)
If you think about the cause of the credit crisis (excessive debt, excessive leverage and a banking sector that is too large and too powerful) and what we have solved in the last year it’s actually quite apparent that we haven’t solved any of the structural problems that actually caused the crisis. The debt in this country is still extraordinary, leverage is making a comeback and the banks have grown larger in what has to be the most incredible power grab in modern economic times. Meanwhile, Bernanke is like the doctor who keeps the cancer patient on life support, but can’t for the life of him, figure out how to extract the cancer and create a healthy self sustaining life. …
"It’s almost as if the biggest credit bubble in history never occurred. Investors are increasingly convinced that a sustainable global recovery is emerging out of the wreckage. All praise to the central bankers for saving the world! I’m waiting till someone writes about the return of the Great Moderation and suggests Ben Bernanke is the new Maestro. Then I’ll know the lunatics have taken over the madhouse…yet again." Albert Edwards, Société Générale
What Simon Johnson is describing in this essay attached below is moral hazard, the corruption of the capitalist system introduced by a Fed (the Economic Donkeys) that recklessly exercises a function as ‘lender of last resort,’ in conjunction with a political environment (less sophisticated Economic Donkeys) that can be politely described as being driven by ‘regulatory capture’ rather than the less euphemistic ‘rampant corruption.’
Moral hazard is not a popular topic, on the left or on the right. When moral hazard was mentioned as a consideration in the bank bailouts proposed by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, a popular liberal economist bombastically expounding with a blog (PLEBEWAG) went into a hissy fit of self-righteous indignation, condemning those who even think about things like ‘moral hazard’ as fundamentalist ethical Luddites.
The problem is that moral hazard is an ethical consideration, a restraint on the tools available for centralized financial engineering. This aversion to restraint is characteristic of neither the moderate right nor the left per se, but it does distinguish the statists from those who favor the individuals and ‘market-based capitalism.’
What can one think about these things, when so many economists can get it so wrong, for so long, with such passionate intensity, and remain largely unapologetic and unchanged themselves, swearing allegiance to the power of financial engineering with just a little more power and purview? Hence the proposal to centralize regulation in the Fed, surely one of the most bizarre suggestions after a crisis caused by the Fed that one can imagine.
It is all part of the momentum of the status quo, those who enable a system at least in part because they believe it in as a first principle, benefit from it, even if they are not direct participants, or may only wish to be beneficiaries of the greater power and prestige of the State.
Bernanke, Geithner, and others have stated the biggest mistake in this depression was the failure to rescue Lehman. I have long disagreed, instead declaring the Bankruptcy of Lehman was one of the few things the Fed got right, even if by accident.
As my colleague Jeremy Warner puts it, Lehman no more caused the economic convulsions of the last year than the assassination of an Austrian prince caused the First World War. There was the little matter of a rising Germany then, and a rising China now. Both scrambled the international system, albeit in different ways.
As of last week, the ABX index of sub-prime mortgage debt showed that AAA-rated securities from early 2007 were trading at 28 cents on the dollar – AA was at 4 cents, near all-time lows. No one can say that $2 trillion (£1.2 trillion) of sub-prime and Alt-A debt is still trading at panic levels, exaggerating losses. The dust has settled. What we can see is that creditors will never recoup their money.
Foreclosures reached 358,000 in August alone. More Americans are being evicted each month than during the entire Depression year of 1932.
We know why the bubble occurred. Call it Greenspanism. Central banks rescued assets each time there was a hiccup, but let booms run unchecked. They pulled "real" rates ever lower, creating addiction to monetary stimulus. Larger doses were required with each cycle, until we hit zero, and it is still not enough. Debt burdens rose to records across the OECD.
Couldn’t they see that this was cheating: stealing from the future? No, they were seduced by "inflation targeting" – watch goods, ignore assets – just as cheap imports from China rendered the doctrine obsolete. It always takes ideology to consummate massive error.
China is trying to plug the gap, belatedly, by ramping up credit 70pc this year, but it will take a cultural revolution to induce the Chinese to spend. The liquidity is leaking into stocks, metals, and property.
The Great Game can continue only as long as deficit countries – currently, US (-$628bn), Spain (-$109bn), Italy (-$62bn), France (-$58bn), Britain (-$53bn), Greece (-$42bn), and east Europe – are willing to bankrupt themselves buying Asian goods. Obviously, this is absurd.
Absurd is correct.
China, in spite of all those misguided souls who believe otherwise, is…
While David Einhorn’s short position in Moody’s (MCO) is by no means new information, we did recently learn that his hedge fund Greenlight Capital is now also short McGraw Hill (MHP), the parent company of fellow ratings agency Standard & Poor’s. He initiated the position after a U.S. judge refused to dismiss a case against the ratings agencies. Those agencies were seeking refuge from such litigation under the notion that their opinions on ratings are protected by free-speech rights. This U.S. District Judge’s refusal to throw out the case could be a landmark ruling, Einhorn says. While this could potentially be a chink in the armor, it is also prudent to point out that 10 of the 11 claims were dismissed; a fact that Moody’s representatives have been quick to point out.
Einhorn presented his short position in Moody’s back at the Ira Sohn Conference where numerous hedge fund managers shared investment ideas. While we can’t track their short positions via SEC filings, we have covered Greenlight’s long portfolio here. Greenlight was up 16.3% for the second quarter and year to date for 2009 is up 21.5%. For more of Einhorn’s tirades shorting companies, we highly recommend reading his book Fooling Some of the People All of the Time: A Long Short Story. In it, you’ll learn how Greenlight constructs and researches investment theses. Not to mention, it’s just an interesting read and story in general.
Instead of summarizing Einhorn’s thoughts regarding why he is short the ratings agencies, we figured we’d just let him tell you himself. Embedded below is his presentation from the Ira Sohn investment conference entitled ‘The Curse of the Triple A.’ You can download the .pdf here or read on below:
So, while he presented that argument back in late May of this year, he appeared on television a few days ago to further elaborate on his argument. Below is the video where he presents his case to CNBC anchors:
And lastly, for posterity’s sake, we would also like to highlight Einhorn’s thoughts on credit from back in 2007 at the Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast. You can download the .pdf here or read the embedded document below:
Certainly interesting thoughts and reading all around. In addition to Greenlight Capital’s short position, we found additional transactions in shares of…
On September 15th 2008, the investment bank filed for bankruptcy after 6 months of protestations by Dick Fuld, Erin Callan and the rest of the brain trust that all was well at 745 Seventh Avenue in Times Square.
Enough has and will be written about the causes but I’ll sum it up for those who love delicious irony:
Lehman became a global powerhouse because of real estate and fixed income, Lehman went bankrupt because of real estate and fixed income.
If you’re reading this from your new/old offices at Barclays Capital Markets, save your breath – I’m not interested in how profitable the investment banking and trading businesses used to be and how you guys got screwed.
The fact of the matter is, without the absurd risks taken in the name of earnings growth and market share, your trading and banking businesses would never have grown to where they were.
Live by the gun, die by the gun.
The fate of Lehman’s profitable units was inextricably linked to the business units that bit off more than they could chew. This is the exact reason why I have been against the paying of bonuses to employees at failed organizations who happened to have run a profitable division amidst the red ink. They were only profitable because of the scale they were blessed with, directly proportional to the size of the mother ship (parent company).
You can’t and shouldn’t have it both ways.
One year later, from living and working on The Street, I can say emphatically that there is much more nostalgia for Bear Stearns than there is for Lehman Brothers. This is ironic because during its lifespan, Bear was always looked at as “the outsider” of the bulge bracket firms.
Lehman’s final months were a mixture of unjustified hubris and calculated deceit. The lengths that were gone to in order to keep up appearances were, in retrospect, extraordinary. Fuld’s game of footsie with sovereign wealth funds and Korean banks should have moved past the foreplay stage way before last September if he really wanted to “save the firm”.
Instead, it turned out that he was more interested in saving his reputation.
How’d that work out?
As big and as important as the average Lehmanite thought their firm was, one year…
This represents my personal opinion, not the views of the SEC or its staff.
I am not going to spend time here talking about how the price of gold is off-the-wall, that it is not just a bubble in the making, but a bubble waiting to burst. I don’t want to waste your time on that point.We all know it is a bubble.
George Soros has said “The ultimate asset bubble is gold”. Many of the top asset managers, such as Tudor and Paulson, are piling on; Paul Tudor Jones recently said gold “has its time and place, and now is that time.” The banks are echoing this view with their research. Goldman has a research piece that looks f...
We know you are busy, we also know you are hell bent on intercepting IOI manipulation as per Mr. Jon Kroeper's recent media appearances. Which is why we kindly request that you get back to us at your earliest convenience with information on how many of the IOIs disclosed below are, in fact, "natural." We will make this a recurring topic on Zero Hedge until such time as you respond to our information request. You can contact us at outsourcefinra@zerohedge.com
Small Caps and Tech continued their good form. Technicals continue to support the move higher for Small Caps (Russell 2000) with new highs for the MACD and +DI line. The Russell 2000 would have to give up 25 points (or 4%) just to test breakout support at 650.
The prior underperformance of the semiconductors was undone with today's 2% gain.
As I always do before options expiration I reviewed our Buy List, which, this quarter, is a list of 37 stocks we've been playing since late December and, sadly, after reviewing 37 of our favorite investments very carefully this week - I could only conclude that cashing them out was the only decision I could be comfortable with this week. Of 66 trades we had on our 37 stocks, 64 are winners with an average return since 2/8 of 28% - since most of the trades were designed to make 40% for the year - it just seems silly not to take the money and run now, on March 19th.
You are not supposed to have 64 out of 66 winners in 6 weeks, you are not supposed to make 3/4 of what you anticipate for the year in 6 weeks - that is NOT how the markets are supposed to work! When the ma...
Tuesday was good and bad for the Oxen Report. Our short sale of the day worked very well for us. I chose Ultrashort Proshares Oil and Gas for our short sale of the day due to my expectation...
BPOP - The ‘popular’ bank popped up on our screens this afternoon after a large-volume risk reversal was established on the stock. The massive trade was likely the work of an investor with knowledge of commercial banks as approximately 60,000 contracts were exchanged on BPOP amid a more than 12% rally in shares of the underlying to $2.60. It appears the trader purchased 30,000 now in-the-money October 2.5 strike calls for an average premium of 33 cents apiece. He funded the purchase of the calls by selling 30,000 puts at the January 2.5 strike for 43 cents each. The investor received a net credit on the transaction of 10 pennies per contract. The motivation is perhaps that this individual is swimming with the rising tide of financial names today and expects a far larger...
Let's take a look at Insider Buying and Selling over the last week or so. These are screen shots from Finviz - the significant buys against a green background first and significant sells against the pink background second. All the buys fit into my screen shot but the sells did not. Click here to see all the sells.
Note that the largest buy in the group, for KITD was at a price of 9.73 (KITD is currently at 11.54). The buy was part of an Equity Offering rather than an open market purchase. Tuzman Kaleil Isaza's (KITD's Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer) history of buys is http://www.insidercow.com/more from Insider
Philip R. Davis is a founder Phil's Stock World, a stock and options trading site that teaches the art of options trading to newcomers and devises advanced strategies for expert traders...
Ilene is editor and affiliate program
coordinator for PSW. She manages the Favorites backup site
(blogroll, archives,
more).
Contact Ilene to learn about our affiliate and
content sharing
programs.
The flip side, of course, is what makes Wall Street so dangerous. You lose money for the firm and you’re a heel. Do it again and you don’t get paid that year. Do it a third time and you’re out of a job. Just like that. Gone. I’ve seen it happen to friends and acquaintances at just about every firm up and down Wall Street. There is no tenure on Wall Street, no job security, no long-term guarantees. Ten- and 20-year careers end in a flash. Happens all the time, and everybody who works in the business knows this.
del.icio.us
Digg
Reddit
Stumble
Yahoo
Facebook
Twitter
Courtesy of 
German
Spanish
French
Italian
Portuguese
Japanese
Korean
Russian
Chinese
Philip R. Davis is a founder Phil's Stock World, a stock and options trading site that teaches the art of options trading to newcomers and devises advanced strategies for expert traders...
Ilene is editor and affiliate program
coordinator for PSW. She manages the Favorites backup site
(